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Abstract
Executive Information Systems (EIS) implementations
are political because they offer an opportunity to change
the organizational power structure.  EIS developers who
ignore this issue when implementing an EIS are bound to
fail.  After all, these systems are targeted at the
organization's most influential executives, and thus have
profound commercial, organizational and political
implications.  The change in information availability
brought about by an EIS implementation can, in turn, lead
to feelings of resentment, concern and resistance among
other members of the organization.  Therefore, an
important issue in EIS implementation is the
organization’s receptiveness to the changes which are
likely to be effected by the EIS.  This paper reports on the
failure of two organizations to successfully implement an
EIS against organizational resistance.  What makes these
cases interesting is not the issue of organizational
resistance, but the fact that they failed against the will of
its top executives, apparently brought about by the
information systems’ contradicting the prevailing
management systems.
Research Method
In order to understand how organizational resistance
affects EIS implementation, three Hong Kong
organizations which had implemented EIS were studied.
One represented a successful EIS implementation, the two
others were failure EIS cases, where the EIS was
abandoned after an initial (prototype) implementation.
The research was conducted through a series of interviews
with several key personnel in each organization.  While
many questions were open-ended, questionnaires were
sent before the interview, thus ensuring that all interviews
followed the same general format and that interviewees
could provide more informative data.
Analysis of the Effects of Organizational
Resistance on EIS
Overview of Companies and Systems
At the outset, all three studied organizations (Railway,
Shipping, Utility) showed several similarities.  All three
organizations had large transaction volumes and all were
using information systems extensively as part of their
operations. While Shipping was the smallest of the three
companies, with only hundreds of employees, it was the
most international in its reach and part of a larger
conglomerate.  But beneath many superficial similarities
lay more fundamental differences which the following
case descriptions will indicate. To identify them, we will
begin with a description of the only success case, which
will serve as a benchmark for the subsequent failure
discussions.
Railway Corporation
Several years ago, executives at the railway
corporation became aware of the importance of having an
IS strategy and decided to place significant investments
(tens of millions of US$) into IS development.  Clearly,
the Railway Corporation was cash rich and willing to
invest heavily into information technology. One of the
major IS initiatives was the development of an EIS.  The
corporation began developing its EIS in that same year.
The first phase was completed a few years later(!), for use
by the Chairman and the heads of each division,
altogether seventeen users. The corporation built its EIS
in-house, instead of buying an off-the-shelf system,
because seemingly no EIS package suited company needs.
In other words, significant in-house expertise and
development resources existed to create this relatively
new technology application.
The international team of railway executives was
willing to use new technology to help compile
information.  Before implementing an EIS, executives had
spent much time in face to face or telephone contact with
peers and subordinates.  Most information was received in
an unstructured way.  After the EIS was implemented,
executives spent less time reading highly structured
information in reports or on computer screens.  Most
executives found the benefits of the EIS and increased use
of the system as a consequence.
Since the whole idea of executives obtaining
information directly from the computer was a novel
concept, the corporation arranged computer training
courses for executives and their support staff.  In addition,
the EIS committee demonstrated the EIS to executives in
their offices.  As a result, the executives became more
computer literate and developed greater reliance on
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information technology.  This overcame the executives’
initial hesitation to the EIS.
In order to overcome company staff members’
resistance to loss of control over information, the
corporation used education, persuasion and negotiation.
The aim was to convince staff that, while management
would access information directly, their roles would not
be diminished and might actually be enhanced.  The data
providers were identified prominently on the screens
displaying their data, and having been given the means to
update, annotate and to provide interpretations of the
information.  Involvement of the data providers in these
ways could seemingly enhance their influence rather than
threaten it.
The high cost of introducing an EIS was not a major
concern in the corporation.  Obviously, the corporation
had strong financial support for IS projects.  Hence,
although the implementation cost of the EIS was high, the
corporation’s Managing Board considered it worthwhile
to develop the system, despite the fact that EIS benefits
were difficult to quantify.
Analysis
The railway corporation made a strategic IS
development decision and did what it take to complete the
implementation.   While one might argue that in-house
development was not the most economical or fastest way
to develop the EIS, the company had enough expertise,
resources, and “stamina”, as well as executive patience, to
create a successful implementation.
There was resistance within the company against the
new system, but this might be considered “normal”
resistance which exists in organizations whenever a new
significant system is launched.  And this resistance was
dealt with effectively, through training,
negotiation/persuasion, and resources.
Shipping Company
The shipping company offers worldwide shipping
services, plus trucking, container chartering, and other
related services.  The company’s EIS project started in the
mid-nineties, sponsored by the company’s executive
director.  Motivated by the organization’s rapid expansion
over the previous years (with a 15-fold staff increase over
10 years), the executive director was seeking a way to
monitor company activities more effectively.  Hence. the
EIS was developed with the aim of providing the ability
to drill down into areas needing further examination to
produce relevant information.  The system was expected
to be used for strategic, business and marketing planning
at the most senior level.  It was intended for all corporate
directors and their immediate assistants.
Because the cost of acquiring an EIS software package
was considered high and a limiting factor to further
growth, the decision was made to develop an in-house
EIS.  This was viewed as a less expensive alternative.  At
that time, key decision makers did not realize the full cost
to develop a complete system, and the substantial
subsequent costs to support it.  With full top executive
support, the company began its EIS project, hired a new
project manager, and immediately started the
development.
As the implementation progressed, it also became
clear that subordinate line managers who traditionally
provided information to the directors, were not willing to
co-operate with the EIS project to define the data needs
for the system.  The middle management felt threatened
by the possibility of a diminished role in supplying
information to executives.  They also feared that their
operations would become too visible to top management.
Their lack of co-operation extended the development
period.
Furthermore, a lack of development staff slowed down
progress even more.  Six months after the introduction of
EIS (prototype), the EIS project manager reported that it
was difficult to get adequate data for the EIS.  The
executive director, who initially had strongly supported
the project did not realize any benefits from it and became
reluctant in further providing his requirements.  The EIS
project manager subsequently was drawn into another,
more urgent project, and the executive director, after
some discussion, decided to cease the project.  No effort
was made thereafter to resurrect any kind of EIS.
Analysis
Several factors seemed to have “derailed” the EIS in
the shipping company, including an inaccurate assessment
of resource requirements and staff shortages.  Yet in any
organization there are projects competing for staff
resources and those deemed strategic by the organization
will get the necessary support, while others will not.
Here, the highest level of management considered the
project strategic, but clearly not middle management.  The
middle management did not want to co-operate with the
EIS team, out of fear that their importance would be
diminished once executives could get information from
computers instead of them.  In addition, since they were
not the users of the EIS, they could not see any personal
benefit from the system.  Therefore, they were not willing
to spend time to help the EIS development team, thus
dragging out the development process to the point were
senior executive interests had finally shifted.
Utility
The utility had a long history in its business and was
serving over a million customers.  Given the large
customer base, the company also processed millions of
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transactions per months, but still, information systems had
a predominantly operational (“backbone”) focus.  The
interest in EIS was initiated by the Managing Director.
He requested the IT department to pilot an EIS, to serve
him and other senior executives, in all about 15 users.
The senior executives felt that there was “too much
information circulating within the organization”.  They
expected that the EIS could help them to improve quality
of data and eliminate unnecessary distribution of
information.
As the utility did not have any experience concerning
EIS development, it was decided that there would be no
attempt to develop an EIS in-house, but to customize a
vendor solution.  Based on its reputation, the Comshare
software was selected.
A Working Committee was set up, comprised of the
Managing director, other key executives, their assistants,
and consultants.  Their role was to define executives’
requirements and develop a prototype. Over a period of
several months, the committee met on a regular basis to
precisely define information needs and presentation
formats to best support executive decision making.
However, the Managing Director found that he did not
have time to oversee the whole EIS project, and therefore
delegated the planning tasks to other executives.
It turned out that defining users’ information needs
was difficult.  The team had a problem to arrange time
with the executives because they were very busy.  And
although executive users were interviewed, they were
often vague and uncertain about their information needs.
Consequently, after the vendor had built full
prototypes of the EIS and let the users browse the
contents of the system, they reported that the system did
not satisfy their needs.  Unclear about the system’s
objectives, they could not see any great benefit in their
continued use of the EIS.  Thereafter, further EIS
development was quickly abandoned.
Analysis
At the utility, executive culture was not ready for the
capabilities an EIS could offer.  Some executive users
were reluctant to embrace the technology because they
decided that the system was too complicated to operate
and access information.  The Managing Director, who had
clear objectives for the EIS, delegated oversight of its
development to other executives who lacked this vision
who lacked a regard for the value of information systems.
Their resistance to the system directly affected the EIS
development.  However, this resistance was not managed
by the EIS team at the utility.  Furthermore, in an
organization where information systems traditionally
were operational (transaction processing), creating a
strategic vision for information systems required
significant extra effort.  The apparent shift in the
Managing Director’s focus away from the system’s
development signalled just the opposite to other members
of the executive team.
Conclusion
EIS introduce a completely new reporting structure in
an organization.  They can shift the balance of power
within an organization, thus resulting in resistance by
those who fear negative effects of that power change.  To
successfully install an EIS, sponsors and designers must
anticipate and manage this resistance, as it is a common
cause of implementation failure (Rockart and DeLong
1988).
Although all three studied organizations had to deal
with resistance against the EIS, one, the Railway
company exhibited just “normal” resistance, which was
managed effectively within the company.   The two
failure cases showed abnormal resistance, with either the
middle management, or members of the executive team
not supporting the implementation if not fighting its
success.
Interestingly enough, the two failure cases occurred in
companies with a Chinese management system.  In the
Chinese management system, the owner typically makes
all strategic and major personnel decisions and the
delegation to middle management is low.  Direct
supervision of work and personal reporting relations are
more important forms of control, and the formal
information system is often ignored and bypassed.
Information then becomes a “currency of power and
influence”, rather than the necessary input for line
managers to make good decisions.   An EIS directly
violates all these principles of the management system
and therefore will require great changes in the
management system, or will face great obstacles.  Yet
with the Chinese management culture, staff members also
tend to be more conservative, unwilling to accept changes
and new ideas.   Thus, EIS success is not at all certain.
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